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NRO & USAF REVIEWS
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Copy 1 of 6

5 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director (Plans)
THROUGH : Chief, Development Projects Division
SUBJECT : Project CORONA
(AFCIN, Awareness by Unauthorized Personnel)
REFERENCE : DPS-5070 - 2 December 1958
DPS-5393 - 6 November 1958

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1. Due to our absence from the D.C. area, it has been difficult for [] and I to review his reported awareness of the CORONA Program.

2. On 27 February we met and discussed this matter at length. He explained his apparent awareness of CORONA as follows:

(a) No specific person advised him of the existence of CORONA as originally seemed to be the case.

(b) He acquired the impression that a satellite project was being conducted by this Agency (yourself) for the following reasons:

(1) The Air Force stopped its effort to develop a Follow-on aircraft.

(2) The Air Force dropped its most promising reconnaissance mechanism, the recovery capsule feature within WS-117L.

(3) ARPA, in the persons of []
[] Captain Robert Truax,
contacted [] as Chairman of Requirements for
WS-117L and talked with him regarding requirements
vital during 1959.

(4) As a member of the "Phil Strong Committee" assessing satellite reconnaissance, [] was privy to the recommendation that such reconnaissance be accomplished in the immediate future via a recoverable satellite.

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(5) [] participation in ARC and his close contact with intelligence collection methods and sources made him sensitive to the probability that this Agency was directly concerned with a recoverable reconnaissance satellite.

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3. The above was [] explanation for his leading questioning of Mr. Reber regarding the "most recent Bissell project." It is my view that we have here an accumulation of awareness [] acquired through several sources (AFCIN, ARPA and WS-117L), and he skillfully surfaced the subject when he felt the interest of the intelligence community, and AFCIN in particular, warranted his probing the issue.

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4. I feel this situation can't be resolved further. However, it does point out a hypersensitiveness within the intelligence community that must be recognized and taken into account whenever a maximum compartmentation effort is contemplated. I plan no further action.

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